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Apr 9, 2010 · Willard Van Orman Quine (1908–2000) worked in theoretical philosophy and in logic. (In practical philosophy—ethics and political philosophy—his contributions are negligible.) He is perhaps best known for his arguments against Logical Empiricism (in particular, against its use of the analytic-synthetic distinction).
- Quine's New Foundations
Quine’s move in [1937a] is the natural one of taking the...
- Anomalous Monism
At times, Davidson appeared to flirt with the idea that the...
- Author and Citation Info
Author and Citation Info - Willard Van Orman Quine -...
- Quine's New Foundations
In other words, Quine accepted that analytic statements are those that are true by definition, then argued that the notion of truth by definition was unsatisfactory. Quine's chief objection to analyticity is with the notion of cognitive synonymy (sameness of meaning).
Jan 14, 2013 · Pursuit of truth. by. Quine, W. V. Publication date. 1990. Topics. Meaning (Philosophy), Reference (Philosophy), Knowledge, Theory of, Semantics (Philosophy) Publisher. Harvard University Press.
Technically, this is the distinction between statements true in virtue of the meanings of their terms (like “a bachelor is an unmarried man”) and statements whose truth is a function not simply of the meanings of terms, but of the way the world is (such as, “That bachelor is wearing a grey suit”).
At the heart of his philosophy are several interconnected doctrines: his rejection of conventionalism and of the linguistic doctrine of logical and mathematical truth; his rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction; his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation; and his thesis of the inscrutability of reference.
Pursuit of Truth. Willard Van Orman Quine. Harvard University Press, 1990 - Language Arts & Disciplines - 113 pages. In Pursuit of Truth W. V. Quine gives us his latest word on issues to which...
By rejecting any sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic truths, Quine is led to the further denial of any type of knowledge that is categorically distinct from that found in our system of empirical knowledge (for details, see Quine 1951; Hylton 2007, 48-80).
