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In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, policymakers continue to reassess the ways in which government and the financial sector interact. Democratic institutions are facing a reappraisal in light of the widespread populism of the past few years. Tucker’s arguments ought to be carefully considered.
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PAPERS. Governance of Non-Financial Risk in an Age of Global...
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IN THE NEWS. The Independent Fed Is America’s Secret...
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CNBC Powerlunch with Sir Paul Tucker 13/5/2018....
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Paul Tucker, chair of the Systemic Risk Council, and Amias...
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Central-banking accountability: A conversation with Sir Paul...
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The best books on The Administrative State recommended by...
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12 Mac 2021 · PAPERS. Governance of Non-Financial Risk in an Age of Global Discord, 24/11/2023. Quantitative easing, monetary policy implementation and the public finances, 06/11/2022. Fiscal, Monetary and Macroprudential Regimes: Incentives-Values Compatibility in Constitutional Democracies, 04/8/2022. Antitrust and Rule by Judges, 04/8/2022.
Sir Paul Tucker (born 24 March 1958) is a British economist, central banker, and author. He was formerly the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, with responsibility for financial stability, and served on the Bank's Monetary Policy Committee from June 2002 until October 2013 [1] and its interim and then full Financial Policy Committee from ...
22 Mei 2018 · Paul Tucker draws on a wealth of personal experience from his many years in domestic and international policymaking to tackle the big issues raised by unelected power, and enriches his discussion with examples from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union.
Now with a new preface by Paul Tucker, Unelected Power explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint.
26 Nov 2018 · Tucker explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint and become models of dispersed power.
Paul Tucker, chair of the Systemic Risk Council and research fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School, draws on his book Unelected Power to discuss central bank independence.
